Abstract-Wireless sensor networks (WSNs) are prone to vulnerabilities due to their resource constraints and deployment in remote and unattended areas. A sensor node exhibits anomaly in behaviour due to its dying energy level or being compromised by the intruders. The node showing anomalous behaviours being a leader node (LN) of a cluster/group multifolds the vulnerability problem. To identify the anomalous nodes in WSNs, this paper presents a model, which uses a Voronoi diagram based network architecture. The network architecture, which deploys mobile data collectors (MDCs), ensures the compatibility of the anomaly detection model for the resource constrained WSNs, and warrants data integrity between the MDCs and the LNs. Our empirical evidence shows the effectiveness of the proposed approach.
I. INTRODUCTION
The advances in wireless sensor networks (WSNs) have attracted a lot of attentions due to the potentiality of broad applications in both military and civilian operations. A WSN may consist of hundreds or even thousands of sensor nodes that have limited power, bandwidth, memory, and computational capabilities [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] . The sheer numbers of sensor nodes, their constraints, and deployment in unattended areas make it impractical to monitor and protect each individual node from a variety of malicious attacks.
An attacker can exploit different mechanisms to spread malicious codes through the networks even without physical contact [6, 7] . For instance, once a particular node is compromised, intruders can launch various malicious codes to launch attacks. They might spoof, alter or replay routing information to interrupt the network routing [1] . They may also launch the Sybil attack [2, 3] , where a single node presents multiple identities to other nodes, or the identity replication attack, in which clones of a compromised node are put into multiple network places [3] . Moreover, adversaries may inject bogus data into the network to consume the scarce network resources [8, 9] . Therefore, it has now become essential to adopt security mechanisms providing confidentiality, authentication, data integrity, and nonrepudiation, along with other security objectives to ensure accurate network operations by the WSNs.
Different anomaly detection models have been proposed in the literature over the years [10-17, 30, 31] . Ngai et al. proposed a model where anomaly detection is performed at the base station [10] . Gupta et al. proposed similar type of anomaly detection model where the sensor nodes send data to the base station to be processed and analysed [11] . However, this centralised approach can create a high volume of data transmission in the network and can congest the network and have been found not very efficient. [12, 13] On the other hand, in distributed approaches, the detection agent is installed in every node. It monitors the behaviour of neighbouring node within its transmission range locally to detect any abnormal behaviour. For example, a trust based model is proposed in [14] , and a rule based model is proposed in [15] , where the collected data are analysed inside the sensor nodes to detect any deviation from normal behaviour using neighbouring historical data stored in the memory. Although these distributed approaches can provide real time detection but they require the system to store the information required in the memory. This can lead to collision and network congestion. It also consumes additional energy resources in the node as it needs to listen to the network promiscuously to perform the detection periodically or continuously. Sensor nodes might not have enough resources to perform these tasks. Hence, a lightweight solution is required.
In addition, if the coordinators (known as leader nodes or cluster heads) of the sensor networks are compromised, all members of the clusters become more vulnerable to different types of security attacks. A compromised leader node (LN) can make other nodes of the networks act like a compromised node, or can change the sensed data by the other nodes of the network. Eventually when the gathered data reach the base station, the malicious data can attack the base station. Thus, keeping the LNs/coordinators and the base station safe from malicious codes is crucial.
However, the real problem in implementing the security mechanisms in WSNs lies in the fact that the sensor nodes are resource constrained. The conventional anomaly detection techniques are not suitable for WSNs [16] . To alleviate the resource constraints in anomaly detection, we propose an anomaly detection technique while collecting data using mobile data collectors (MDCs). The main contributions of the proposed anomaly detection model are multi-folds:
• The proposed anomaly detection technique identifies data anomaly on-site and dynamically during the data collection period.
• The overhead of the proposed technique is minimal as the anomaly detection technique runs in parallel within the MDCs uses the existing data collection using mobile nodes such as described in [17] .
• The proposed method prevents not only the members of a cluster or chain, but also the leader of the cluster/chain from malicious activities. Additionally, as the mobile data collectors are carrying messages to the base station (BS), the BS can also be kept safe from the malicious activities.
• Instead of running the anomaly detection procedure in the sensor nodes, the MDCs run the anomaly detection procedures, and save resources for the sensor nodes. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we discuss the design issues that we considered for the proposed anomaly detection technique. Section 3 briefly discusses the network architecture used for the proposed anomaly detection technique. The proposed anomaly detection technique is described is Section 4. We describe the experimental setup, which are used to analyse the performance of the proposed technique, in Section 5. In Section 6, we discuss the experimental result and provide a comprehensive analysis of the proposed anomaly detection technique. Finally, in Section 7, we draw the conclusion and describe the future work.
II. ISSUES IN ANOMALY DETECTION IN WSNs
While designing anomaly detection techniques for WSNs several issues need to be considered. In this section we discuss these issues. All the issues were considered while designing the proposed anomaly detection technique.
The first issue to be discussed is regarding establishing the detection model for the anomaly detection technique. Models representing the normal and abnormal characteristics of WSNs need to be established before anomaly detection can be carried out. Depending on the availability of pre-defined data, the model can be established using supervised, semi-supervised and unsupervised learning approaches. Unlike supervised and semi-supervised approaches, unsupervised anomaly detection does not require any pre-labelled data available to train the system. It can detect the anomalies by applying various statistical distribution and distance functions to build the model based on the observed behaviour of the systems. This approach is very suitable for real world applications especially in WSNs where pre-labelled data are not easily available and the behaviour of the systems cannot be determined prior to deployment [18] . To test the proposed anomaly detection technique we used the supervised learning in our simulation for measuring the performance effectiveness. In the real world scenario the test can be modified to unsupervised learning.
The second issue to be discussed is the approaches of the deploying detection engine. There are three different approaches of deploying a detection agent namely centralised detection, distributed detection and hybrid detection. Gupta et al. proposed centralised type of anomaly detection model where the sensor nodes send data to the base station to be processed and analysed [11] . This exposes the LNs and the base stations to the malicious codes injected in the compromised sensor nodes. In addition, their centralised approach creates a high volume of data transmission in the network and can congest the network and has been found not very efficient. [12, 13] . On the other hand, in distributed approach, the detection agent is installed in every node. However, this might not be feasible for the resource constrained sensor nodes. For this reason, we propose the detection engine to be placed in the mobile data collectors.
The third issue to be discussed is regarding the complexity of the anomaly detection technique. A simple and low computational complexity anomaly detection algorithm is preferable whenever the detection of anomaly is performed individually inside the sensor nodes. However, the lightweight procedure may not be as efficient as a robust anomaly detection algorithm. Thus, an MDC would be the best choice to run the anomaly detection algorithm as an MDC usually has more resource available to use more complex traditional detection algorithms to improve the accuracy. It also has more storage to log historical data which can assist in detecting anomalies.
The other issues which were considered in designing the proposed anomaly detection technique are discussed below. In general, the sensor nodes in a WSN create logical topologies after the deployment, and form clusters. The sensor nodes of a cluster send the sensed data to the cluster's LN or coordinator. If the LN is compromised, these nodes can be used by the intruders to compromise other nodes. Thus, leader node compromise is a serious threat to a WSN that is deployed in unattended and hostile environments. One possible solution of this problem is not to allow the LNs to use any sensed data from its cluster until those data are checked and found anomaly free. In the proposed anomaly detection technique this issue was taken care of.
Declaring the anomalies is an important part of anomaly detection technique. In this part the nodes that are showing anomaly behaviours are reported to the other nodes. There are two conventional methods to declare whether a node is compromised or not [19, 20] . The first method is based on cooperative decision making where all nodes will take the responsibility to perform the anomaly detection and send the alerts. A node is only declared as compromised after a majority number of alert have been received from the neighbouring nodes within the transmission range. An alternative method is to use a trusted value assigned to an individual node where only nodes with a trusted value above a certain threshold can send the alert to the base station. The base station will assign trust values to each nodes based on a certain reliability condition of the data received from them [20] . Both methods described above increases the computational and communication complexities of the WSN. Thus, it would be preferable to appoint a trusted third party (the MDCs in the proposed anomaly detection technique) to declare the anomalies after the data is analysed. Anomaly detection should be done dynamically and should provide a fast and real-time detection as the cost of misclassification can lead to a major loss. Additionally, as the topology of the WSN may change at any time, or new sensors may be added in the network, the anomaly detection technique should be scalable. In designing the proposed anomaly detection technique all these criteria were taken into account.
III. NETWORK ARCHITECTURE MODEL
The network architecture of WSNs can be divided into two major categories-i) flat architecture: this is actually no topology, or the absence of any defined topology where each sensor plays an equal role in network formation, and ii) hierarchical architecture: the sensor nodes construct cluster, or trees, or chains, and communicate using hierarchical fashion. The proposed anomaly node detection technique can be deployed over all hierarchical networks, either in cluster based or tree based or chain oriented network. In this paper, we consider the network topology is chain oriented topology. In a chain oriented sensor network, multiple chains can be constructed, where all the chains will be restricted to Voronoi cells [5] . Furthermore, in these topological networks, mobile data collectors can be used to collect data from the deployed sensor nodes [17] .
A. Terminologies
This section provides the following terminologies used in this paper and their definitions.
MDC:
A mobile data collector is assigned in each region, and it takes the responsibility of gathering data from the LNs in the region while traversing their transmission ranges. The traversal paths of the MDCs are determined using the Voronoi diagram constructed with respect to the LNs [17] .
Region: Based on its size, the total area of the target field is divided into several regions. The created regions are non-overlapping, i.e., each sensor node belongs to only one region. The regions are created using an imaginary curved line that follows the Voronoi edges. For example, in Fig. 1 , the target field is divided into two regions, separated by the region separator line.
Polling points: An MDC roams within each region and stops at some locations to collect data from the LNs. These positions are called polling points. To make the communication most effective, polling points should be equidistant from the associated LNs. As the Voronoi edge between two points is always equidistant from the two points, the polling points can be measured by using the Voronoi edges of the LNs.
B. Assumptions Related to MDCs
The following assumptions are made specific to the MDCs:
• It is assumed that MDCs have access to a continuous power supply. Usually the BS is equipped with the source of continuous power supply. Thus, when an MDC visits the base station, it can replace its battery.
• It is assumed that the MDCs are familiar with the target field. Location images of the target field can be stored in each MDC. Thus, an MDC is able to visit any point within the target field.
• It is also assumed that each MDC can forward the gathered data to one of the nearby MDCs when they are close enough, such that data can eventually be forwarded to the MDC that will visit the static data sink.
C. An overview of the network architecture
The LNs of a hierarchically structured WSN collect data sensed by all member nodes of that chain. While MDCs are moving through the target field, they stop at the polling points to poll the nearby leader nodes to gather data packets that the leader nodes collected from other member nodes. Thus, when an MDC collects data packets from a leader node, it virtually collects data from all sensor nodes associated with that cluster.
When an MDC moves to a polling point, it polls the nearby leader nodes with the same transmission power as that of the leader nodes, such that the leader nodes that receive the polling messages can upload packets to their associated MDC within a single hop. Each MDC could be equipped with two antennas, which means that at each time slot, up to two leader nodes can send data simultaneously to an MDC by utilizing the spatial division multiple access (SDMA) technique.
The operations of the tour of an MDC can be divided into two parts: traversal path of the MDC that specifies the movement of the MDC, and uploading of data, which specifies how the leader nodes interact with the MDC. Thus, the data gathering time in a region is the aggregation of the moving time of the MDC and data uploading time of the leader nodes in the region. An MDC arriving at a polling point in its region collects data from the associated leader nodes and then moves straight to the next polling point in the tour. Thus, the moving tour of an MDC consists of a number of polling points in its region and the line segments connecting them.
An overview of the architectural model is illustrated in Figure 1 . The leader nodes are depicted using the blue coloured dots. All the sensor nodes deployed inside a Voronoi cell send their data to the leader nodes. On the other hand, the mobile data collectors visit the polling points on a regular basis and collect data from the leader nodes. The data gathering scheme for large scaled wireless sensor networks can be extended by using multiple MDCs and SDMA technique. This is described in details in [17] . For example, in Fig.  1 , two MDCs travel within the network and collect data from the leader nodes. The two MDCs work at the same time, and when an MDC arrives at a polling point, leader nodes associated with this polling point are scheduled to communicate with the MDC. Two leader nodes in a compatible pair can upload data simultaneously in a time slot, while an isolated leader (i.e., a leader by itself or not in any compatible pair) sends data to the MDC separately.
The BS is usually situated outside the sensing field. Sending the data by the sensors to the remote BS may lead to non-uniform energy consumption among the sensors, because the sensor nodes (or leader nodes) that are responsible for sending data to the BS, need to cover long-range distances. As a result, they deplete energy much faster than other sensor nodes, and die quickly [21, 22, 23] . The consequence of this situation may result in partitioning the network and loss of robustness. However recent studies [24, 25, 26] have proposed sink mobility or collecting data using a mobile device as an efficient solution for data gathering problem. Employing mobile devices to collect data can reduce the effects of the hotspots problem, balance energy consumption among sensor nodes, and thereby prolong the network lifetime to a great extent [27, 28] . In the network architecture, an MDC travels within each region and stops at some locations to collect data from the leader nodes. These positions are called polling points. To make the communication most effective, polling points should be equidistant from the associated leader nodes. Fig. 2 shows some positions of polling points in four different cases. If there are only two leader nodes, the position of the polling point can be found at the intersection between the Voronoi edge and the line joining the two leader nodes (Fig. 2(a) ). For more than two leader nodes, the polling point can be found at the intersection of different Voronoi edges (Fig. 2(b-d) ). Any two leader nodes associated with the same polling point are said to be compatible if an MDC arriving at this polling point can successfully decode the multiplexing signals concurrently transmitted from these two leader nodes.
IV. ANOMALY DETECTION METHOD
In this section we describe how MDCs facilitate the proposed anomaly detection technique. It is to be noted that in the proposed technique, anomaly detection algorithms run inside the MDCs instead of sensor nodes. This reduces the burden of the sensor nodes, which is highly recommended. In Fig. 3 , we depict the steps of anomaly detection technique in a single data collection round by the MDC.
Each MDC is specific to a region, where multiple polling points are located. The MDC chooses a path to travel through different polling points to cover all leader nodes. By the time the MDC visits a polling point, the LNs associated with the polling point collect data from their clusters' member sensor nodes, and keep the sensors' data in the LN's buffer memory. The leader node's buffer memory is assumed to be a volatile memory.
At first, the MDC collects data from a leader node (LN), and test the data to identify if the leader node is compromised. For a compromised LN, the MDC generates a report, and suspends the LN. On the other side, the MDC, after detecting the LN is not compromised, collects the sensor data stored in LN's buffer, and pass the data through the detection engine. If there is no anomaly, the MDC sends a positive acknowledgment (ACK) to the LN. Otherwise, the MDC sends a negative acknowledgment (NACK) identifying the sensor node involved in anomaly. The LN can then suspend the member node from the cluster. Fig. 4 illustrates the overview of our proposed detection model. The figure shows that each node has a unique node ID (nID). Thus if the MDC detects any anomaly behavior of data, it can identify the anomalous node. The MDC informs the LN victim node.
The MDC checks the other LNs associated with the polling point, and then moves to the next polling point for further investigation. When all the polling points are visited by the MDC, it returns to the BS and deliver all reports and data to the BS. The purpose of this experiment is to evaluate the effectiveness of anomaly detection of LN within WSN region. Our evaluation is based on a real-life dataset in which the modes or partitions in the data can be controlled.
We use a real-life dataset called the IBRL dataset in our evaluation [29] . The IBRL data set includes a log of about 2.3 million readings collected from 54 sensor nodes. The total log size is 150MB and the data were averaged over all time. The IBRL data is a publicly available set of sensor measurements gathered from a wireless sensor network deployed in the Intel Berkeley Research Laboratory [29] . In this data set they used temperature and humidity data of 12 hour periods. In this period, as shown in Fig. 5 , one of the sensors started to report erroneous data or abnormal data. This can be seen as a dotted block in the Figure 5 (a) and the elaboration in the Figure 5(b) . Although the behaviour analysis showed that most sensors had such activity toward the end of the experiment, this particular sensor started the drift earlier than other sensors.
To investigate the effect of a non-homogeneous environment, a synthetic dataset, from real dataset, with five disjoint clusters was built. Data from each sensor was gathered randomly according to the distribution (cluster) assigned to that sensor. The data is generated so that it has the same range as the IBRL dataset. Since each sensor recorded multiple readings of the same temperature and humidity, we can compress the data. Instead of keeping all (temperature, humidity) attributers, only unique attributes have been kept with their relative frequency of occurrence. Also, temperature and humidity values have been rounded up to whole numbers. With this method, the volume of the data has been reduced significantly by over an order of magnitude.
Detection engine: The first step of our detection engine is to select the parameters to monitor and group them in a pattern vector
where µ the observation index and n is the number of parameter types or key performance indices (KPI's) chosen to monitor the environmental condition. In our detection method we applied the concept of discrete wavelet transform (DWT) technique proposed in [19] , which is a mathematical transform that separates the data signal into fine-scale information known as details coefficients, and rough-scale information known as approximate coefficients. In our technique we use two parameters; one is support thresholdθ, and other is correlation threshold order to decide whether data is normal or abnormal. We have assumed the support threshold θ the correlation threshold δ =0.0018X10 data characteristics, as shown in Fig. 6 temperature is > θ and Humidity is <δ we called this data as malicious data; otherwise the rest of the data is treated as normal.
After the threshold calculation and the parameters selection from the data sets, we produce our experimental databases. In our experiment, we calculated the feature weights and averaged it to make a class value ( each feature set.
To prepare our experimental dataset we particular leader node N i contains k ¯(N i ). This data set is divided into training dataset (t j1 ,t j2 ,…,t j|G| ) ,and each entry Q j in the test set is represented by a vector Q j =(q j1 ,q j2 ,…,q represents the global set of ¯(N i ). We use the training dataset to train the classifier algorithm to evaluate the test dataset as illustrated in Fig. 7 .
In our classification process, we used machine learning based method to evaluate the perfo system. We built a program interface to WEKA(www.cs.waikato.ac.nz/ml/weka perform our classification. Our analysis of the literature on classification algorithms and our prelimi In our technique we use two parameters; one is , and other is correlation threshold δ, in order to decide whether data is normal or abnormal. We =0.0040X10 4 and =0.0018X10 4 , based on our data characteristics, as shown in Fig. 6 . For instance the we called this data as malicious data; otherwise the rest of the data is treated After the threshold calculation and the parameters selection from the data sets, we produce our experimental databases. In our experiment, we calculated the feature weights and averaged it to make a class value (CV) for o prepare our experimental dataset we consider a instances of data ). This data set is divided into training dataset
Each entry T j in the training set is represented by the vector in the test set is ,…,q j|G| ) where G We use the training dataset to train the classifier algorithm to evaluate the test we used machine to evaluate the performance of the system. We built a program interface to www.cs.waikato.ac.nz/ml/weka) in order to perform our classification. Our analysis of the literature on classification algorithms and our preliminary testing led to the choice of algorithms to use support vector machine (SVM) in our present classification work.
In the method of testing, we generate the training set and test set Q and converts both sets into WEKA data format. We pass training set T train the classifiers and then test the effectiveness with test set Q. Our program is designed in such a way that the system can select the families and the corresponding classifiers according to our requirements rather than the default in WEKA. In our experiment we apply 10 cross validation in all cases, as this is a standard, well accepted method of classification increase the chance of learning all the relevant information in the training set.
VI. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
The effectiveness of our WSN malicious data detection technique can be measured by the number of FP (false positive) alarms and the TP (true positive) alarms.
Since our dataset (IRBL), there are no predefined labels for malicious data, we assessed the data and labelled as malicious data that falls outside the expected value range. In our experiment, we have chosen two parameters, namely temperature and humidity. Figure 8 shows the average performance of our experiment. In the graph it has been shown that the performance of detection ratio is approximately 95%. It is clear from the graph that the node n abnormal behaviour which falls outside of our measured value. Also we can see some of nodes, n performance below the measured value.
led to the choice of algorithms to use support vector machine (SVM) in our present classification work.
In the method of testing, we generate the training set T and converts both sets into WEKA data T to the WEKA library to train the classifiers and then test the effectiveness with . Our program is designed in such a way that the system can select the families and the corresponding classifiers according to our requirements rather than the fault in WEKA. In our experiment we apply 10-fold cross validation in all cases, as this is a standard, well accepted method of classification in a number domain, to increase the chance of learning all the relevant
The effectiveness of our WSN malicious data detection technique can be measured by the number of FP (false ue positive) alarms. Since our dataset (IRBL), there are no predefined labels for malicious data, we assessed the data and labelled as malicious data that falls outside the expected value range. In our experiment, we have chosen two erature and humidity. shows the average performance of our experiment. In the graph it has been shown that the performance of detection ratio is approximately 95%. It is clear from the graph that the node n 11 and n 13~n19 shows ich falls outside of our measured value. Also we can see some of nodes, n 46~n51 shows the performance below the measured value. According to our estimation, those node will be identified as malicious node due to their abnormal behaviour of sending data. Figure 9 shows the Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) report of our second data set, where we have used five different clusters. The AUC is a popular measure of the accuracy of an experiment. All things being equal, the larger the AUC, the better the experiment is at predicting by the existence of the classification. The possible values of AUC range from 0.5 (no diagnostic ability) to 1.0 (perfect diagnostic ability). The CI option specifies the value of alpha to be used in all CIs. The Alpha) is the confidence coefficient (or confidence level) of all CIs. The P-value represents the hypotheses tests for each of the criterion variables.
Obviously, a useful experiment should have a cut value at which the true positive rate is high and the false positive rate is low. In fact, a near-perfect classification would have an ROC curve that is almost vertical from (0, 0) to (0, 1) and then horizontal to (1, 1) . The diagonal line serves as a reference line since it is the ROC curve of experiment that is useless in determining the classification. It has been shown from the figure that the abnormality of sensor node falls in second cluster ( 9.b) and last cluster (Figure 9 .e). The best cluster is cluster 1 (Figure 8 .a) and cluster 4 (F reflects the similar picture presented in F Figure 9 (a). AUC of Chain 1 According to our estimation, those node will be identified as malicious node due to their abnormal behaviour of Receiver Operating Characteristic where we have used five different clusters. The AUC is a popular measure of the accuracy of an experiment. All things being equal, the the better the experiment is at predicting by the existence of the classification. The possible values of AUC range from 0.5 (no diagnostic ability) to 1.0 (perfect diagnostic ability). The CI option specifies the value of alpha to be used in all CIs. The quantity (1-Alpha) is the confidence coefficient (or confidence level) value represents the hypotheses tests for bviously, a useful experiment should have a cut-off value at which the true positive rate is high and the false perfect classification would have an ROC curve that is almost vertical from (0, zontal to (1, 1). The diagonal line serves as a reference line since it is the ROC curve of experiment that is useless in determining the classification. It has been shown from the figure that the abnormality of sensor node falls in second cluster ( Figure  . 
VII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORKS
This paper proposed a model to identify malicious node from real-world datasets within a non WSN. Our model ensured the data integrity within LN and BS by deploying a detection engine within the MDC. In our simulation, the results show that we can achieve ~95% of detection rates based on our measured va using the real data. In terms of the true alarm rate, the proposed algorithm outperforms. It has been noted that detection ratio has an impact on selecting the threshold value. Our results suggest that the finding optimum threshold can lead to more effective anomaly detection. In particular, our results confirm that the proposed algorithm can maintain acceptable anomaly detection accuracy while using just half of the input data. However, AUC of Chain 4 AUC of Chain 5
This paper proposed a model to identify malicious world datasets within a non-homogeneous WSN. Our model ensured the data integrity within LN and BS by deploying a detection engine within the MDC. In our simulation, the results show that we can achieve ~95% of detection rates based on our measured value using the real data. In terms of the true alarm rate, the proposed algorithm outperforms. It has been noted that detection ratio has an impact on selecting the threshold value. Our results suggest that the finding optimum ective anomaly detection. In particular, our results confirm that the proposed algorithm can maintain acceptable anomaly detection accuracy while using just half of the input data. However, the key drawback of our experiment is the undefined malicious components in data levels. In our experiment, we used the trial and error method in selecting the threshold values to detect anomalies.
In the future, we plan to extend our work to investigate anomaly detection with actual faults obtained from the real environment, and study its performance by increasing the discrete wavelet transform level and considering other different types of parameters. Furthermore, we also plan to investigate ways to identify and eliminate erroneous sensor readings at the sensor nodes, which could help further reduce wasted energy from transmitting unwanted erroneous measurements to the base station. the key drawback of our experiment is the undefined ponents in data levels. In our experiment, we used the trial and error method in selecting the threshold values to detect anomalies.
In the future, we plan to extend our work to investigate anomaly detection with actual faults obtained from the nment, and study its performance by increasing the discrete wavelet transform level and considering other different types of parameters. Furthermore, we also plan to investigate ways to identify and eliminate erroneous sensor readings at the sensor which could help further reduce wasted energy from transmitting unwanted erroneous measurements to
